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A PHYSICIAN'S RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR LIABILITY
FOR THE NEGLIGENT ACTS OF OTHER MEDICAL




Consider the following scenario. An auto accident victim is
brought into a hospital emergency room. The treating physician orally
orders a nurse' to obtain x-rays of the victim's head, ribs, legs, and
spine. The nurse fails to request x-rays of the patient's spine when she
fills out the x-ray requisition form. The patient's spinal injury is aggra-
vated because it is not promptly diagnosed or treated. Should the physi-
cian be vicariously liable for the nurse's negligence?' Does it depend on
whether the physician is the nurse's employer?' What if the physician
and nurse are employees of the hospital?4 What if the physician is in
private practice and is in the hospital as a "staff physician" and the
nurse is a hospital employee? 5 What if. . . the list goes on and on, but
the complexity of interrelationships in the health care industry should
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David Newbern.
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1. Nurses will be used as examples throughout this article. The intent is not to degrade,
disparage, or criticize nursing as a profession in any way. However, nurses stand in a unique
position, and it is only natural to think of nurses and physicians together when considering a
medical malpractice suit.
2. Held "no" on similar facts in Davis v. Schneider, 182 Ind. App. 275, 395 N.E.2d 283
(1979).
3. See Runyan v. Goodrum, 147 Ark. 481, 228 S.W. 397 (1921,) (physician held not liable
for negligence of employee x-ray technician). See infra notes 140-45 and accompanying text for a
full discussion of Runyan.
4. See Plunkett v. Hayes, 180 Ark. 505, 21 S.W.2d 851 (1929) (clinic's doctor could be
liable for negligence of clinic's nurse). See infra notes 152-62 and accompanying-text for a full
discussion of Plunkett.
5. See Fortson v. McNamara, 508 So.2d 35 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) rev. denied 520 So.
2d 584 (Fla. 1988) (surgeon not liable for negligence of hospital employed nurse anesthetist).
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be apparent by now.'
This article explores the theories under which a physician may be
liable for the negligence or malpractice of other medical professionals."
Understanding a physician's exposure to vicarious liability involves an
analysis of basic agency law and the doctrine of respondeat superior, as
well as the "borrowed servant" rules" and the "captain-of-the-ship"
doctrine,9 both generally and in Arkansas. Based on the analysis, this
article will conclude with a discussion of proposed guidelines for the
Arkansas courts to use in approaching the problem of a doctor's re-
spondeat superior liability for the acts of other medical professionals.10
II. RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR - BASIC AGENCY RULES
Respondeat superior is a basic agency rule of liability whereby an
employer, master, or principal is liable for the negligent acts of his em-
ployees, servants, or agents when those acts arise in the course and
scope of their employment, service, or agency." This basic rule
originated in Jones v. Hart" and has survived basically unchanged.1
3
As applied to the health care industry, the general rule is that a physi-
cian is "responsible for an injury done to a patient through the want of
6. For an expanded discussion of the types and nature of interrelationships see Reuter,
Toward a More Realistic and Consistent Use of Respondeat Superior in the Hospital, 29 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 601, 631-37 and 651-54 (1985). See generally SMITH & KALUZNY, THE WHITE
LABYRINTH (1975).
7. The term "medical professionals" includes those who commonly must meet state licens-
ing and educational requirements in order to legally carry out certain patient care functions. This
includes, but is not limited to, physicians, registered nurses, licensed practical nurses, x-ray techni-
cians, and certified lab technicians. See generally ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 17-80-101 to 17-100-308
(1987 & Supp. 1989) (establishing licensing requirements for various medical professions) and §
16-114-201(2) (1987) (defining "medical care provider").
8. See infra notes 66-116 and accompanying text. See generally Reuter, supra note 8, at
608-11; Morris, The Negligent Nurse-The Physician and the Hospital, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 109,
123-28 (1987).
9. See infra notes 117-45 and accompanying text. See generally Reuter, supra note 6, at
643-48; Morris, supra note 8, at 124-28.
10. See infra notes 192-231 and accompanying text.
11. J. SLAIN, C. THOMPSON & F. BEIN, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP AND EMPLOYMENT-A
TRANSACTIONAL APPROACH 2-1 (1980).
12. 90 Eng. Rep. 1255 (1698). In this case a pawnbroker was found liable when his em-
ployee sold an article he was not supposed to sell. Chief Justice Holt ruled that the acts of a
servant were the acts of the master when the servant acted with the master's authority.
13. The original justification for the rule has generally been discredited. Today the rule is
justified by the "enterprise liability" theory. See Classen, Hospital Liability for Independent Con-
tractors: Where Do We Go From Here?, 40 ARK. L. REV. 469, 472-73 (1987).
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proper skill and care in his assistant, apprentice, agent, or employee."' 4
However, there are exceptions to the rule.1 5
First, before a physician can be held vicariously liable for the acts
of another, the other person must have been negligent in some way. 16
This requirement makes sense. Without it a physician/employer would
be liable for all injuries occasioned by acts of an employee that occur
while the employee is "on the job."' 7 Further, it must be remembered
that an employer held liable under a respondeat superior theory has a
right to seek indemnity from the employee who caused the injury." In
most jurisdictions the employer and tortfeasor are jointly and severally
liable to the injured plaintiff." It appears then, that a physician in pri-
vate practice will be vicariously liable under the rule of respondeat su-
perior when an employee negligently causes a patient to be injured.
20
However, in the medical field a question arises as to when a physi-
cian should be liable for the negligence of other medical professionals."
Such instances of questionable liability include: when a nurse gives an
improper medication; when a physician carries out an improper course
of treatment relying on a nurse's faulty entries on a patient's chart;
when an improper course of treatment results from incorrect or faulty
laboratory test results; when an anesthesiologist makes an error in sur-
gery; and when an x-ray technician injures a patient.
The reason for questioning the physician's liability is that the
nurse, x-ray technician, and anesthesiologist are professionals in their
own right. 2 Each professional therefore has his own duty to the patient
14. 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 85 (1987).
15. A prime exception is found in Runyan v. Goodrum, 147 Ark. 481, 228 S.W. 397
(1921). See supra note 3 and infra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
16. "[W]hen a master and servant are sued together for the same act of negligence, and the
master's liability, if any, rests wholly upon the servant's negligence, a verdict for the servant nec-
essarily exonerates the master." Whitfield v. Whittaker Memorial Hosp., 210 Va. 176, 183, 169
S.E.2d 563, 568 (1969). See also Reuter, supra note 6, at 605.
17. Reuter, supra note 6, at 606.
18. "[A]n employer held vicariously liable to a third person injured by the negligence of an
employee, without negligence on the part of the employer, may seek indemnity against the em-
ployee." Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. Turner, 260 Or. 30, 34, 488 P.2d 429, 431 (1971). See
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 401 comment d (1958).
19. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 401 comment d (1958).
20. Id. Of course the employee must be working within his scope of employment at the time
of the injury. Id.
21. This is particularly true of registered nurses.
22. See generally I. MURCHISON, T. NICHOLS & R. HANSON. LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN
THE NURSING PROCESS (2d ed. 1982) [hereinafter ACCOUNTABILITY]; H. CREIGHTON, LAW
EVERY NURSE SHOULD KNOW (5th ed. 1986) [hereinafter EVERY NURSE].
1991]
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which is independent from that of the treating physician. The issue is
whether medical professionals should be independently liable for their
own acts, or should liability be imputed to the treating physician.
A few jurisdictions have recognized the validity of holding medical
professionals independently liable for their own acts. In Runyan v.
Goodrum2" a physician was found not liable for the acts of his em-
ployee, an x-ray technician.24 The court based its decision on the fact
that the physician was a general practitioner, not a radiology specialist,
and the x-ray technician had specialized training in the use of the
equipment.2" In Thompson v. Presbyterian Hospital, Inc.2 a surgeon
was held not liable for brain damage that occurred because the anes-
thesiologist was negligent in failing to obtain a medical history and to
physically examine the patient before administering the anesthesia. 7 In
Thomas v. Raleigh General Hospital" the court stated that an assign-
ment of liability based on the theory of actual control was a more real-
istic approach 9 in light of today's increasing use of specialists."0
The theme throughout these cases is that a physician does not ex-
ercise "control" over other professionals' preferences for carrying out
their duties."1 The truth in this approach is apparent. Physicians rou-
tinely order x-rays to be taken, medications to be dispensed, anesthesi-
ologists to prepare a patient for surgery, but they do not give detailed
instructions as to the manner of the other professional's performance.
3 2
They do not "control" the other professional. They merely assign a task
and rely on the other's skill and training as to how the task is to be
23. 147 Ark. 481, 228 S.W. 397 (1921).
24. Id. at 499, 228 S.W. at 404.
25. Id. at 489, 228 S.W. at 399-400.
26. 652 P.2d 260 (Okla. 1982).
27. "Agency cannot avail here for imputing to the surgeon the anesthesiologist's allegedly
negligent conduct." Id. at 265.
28. 358 S.E. 2d 222 (W. Va. 1987).
29. Id. at 225.
30. Id.
31. The right of control is a basic requirement of a principal-agent relationship. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § I comment a (1958).
32. "A physician can spend only a short time at the bedside of each patient and he must
therefore leave the actual fulfillment of his prescribed treatment to others . . . .If this were not
the accepted practice, no person of moderate means could afford to employ [a physician]."
Swigerd v. City of Ortonville, 246 Minn. 339, 343, 75 N.W.2d 217, 220 (1956). "Nursing prac-
tice includes but is not limited to administration, teaching, counseling, supervision, delegation, and
evaluation of practice and execution of the medical regimen, including the administration of medi-
cations and treatments prescribed by any person authorized by state law to prescribe." EVERY




In order for a plaintiff to successfully sue a physician on a respon-
deat superior claim he must show that the tortfeasor was acting on the
physician's orders and that the physician had a right of control over the
tortfeasor's actions.3 4 It is by the right to control the manner of per-
formance that plaintiffs routinely prove the existence of an employee-
employer relationship.3" The cases cited above seem to indicate that, at
least in the medical profession, not only should a right of control exist,
but also the plaintiff should show actual control.3 s In the absence of
actual control, the cases appear to say that other professionals should
be treated as independent contractors in their working relationships
with doctors.37
If other professionals are treated as independent contractors, phy-
sicians will not be liable for other professionals' negligent acts on a
respondeat superior theory.38 Physicians could still be liable in their
own right for negligent hiring or supervising of other professionals, 9
but would be presumed to have no control over the manner of the other
33. This is not to say a physician cannot or does not have a right to give detailed instruc-
tions or otherwise direct the other professional's performance. But see EVERY NURSE, supra note
22.
The services routinely provided by the nurses . . . included, among others, the taking of
history; breast and pelvic examinations; laboratory testing of [PAP] smears, gonorrhea
cultures and blood serology; giving information about and providing oral contraceptives,
condoms and [IUDs]; the dispensing of certain designated medications; and counseling
services and community education.
Id. at 18 (citing Sermchief v. Gonzales, 660 S.W.2d 683 (Mo. 1983)). See also ACCOUNTABILITY,
supra note 22. "[Plhysicians ... cannot by fiat or policy substitute their wishes for nursing behav-
ior for proper nursing conduct ...they cannot substitute for the necessary educational back-
ground, the reasonable use of skill in providing nursing care, and the exercise of that informed
judgement that is the hallmark of the professional nurse." Id. at 3.
34. See supra notes 11 and 14 and accompanying text. Compare infra notes 102-09 and
accompanying text (discussing "actual control" vs. "right to control").
35. In fact, it is generally held that a right to control must exist for an employer-employee
relationship to come into being. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958).
36. It is logical to assume, for example, in Runyan, 147 Ark. 481, 228 S.W. 397 (1921),
that the physician as the employer had a right of control over the x-ray technician. However, it is
obvious from the case that he did not exercise "actual control." See generally infra notes 102-09
and accompanying text.
37. The practical effect of Runyan, 147 Ark. 481, 228 S.W. 397 (1921), Thompson, 652
P.2d 260 (Okla. 1982), and Thomas, 358 S.E.2d 222 (W. Va. 1987) is to do just that. See also
EVERY NURSE, supra note 22, "[Wlhen nurses are carrying out their professional acts concerned
with patients' medical or nursing needs, i.e., following physicians' orders, they may be independent
contractors." Id. at 110.
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 2 comment b and 250 (1958).
39. Id. at § 213.
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professionals' performances in carrying out their duties. 0
Strong arguments for this approach exist in the licensing require-
ments, 4 ' statutory regulations,
4 2  and educational requirements
43  of
most health care professionals. Also of importance to this approach are
the kinds of duties performed and the professionals' range of discretion
in carrying them out.4 ' Finally, in support of this approach is the basic
legal reasoning that every man should be responsible for his own acts.
Advocates of this approach would hold that a physician cannot be
liable under a respondeat superior theory when he does not exercise
actual control over tortfeasors acting within the range of their profes-
sional discretion at the time of the plaintiff's injury.45 Under this the-
ory, carried to its logical conclusion, a physician would not be liable for
the torts of his professional employees as long as he was not exercising
actual control over the employee at the time of injury.' 6
An argument against this position is that the duties owed a patient
by his physician are non-delegable. Under this theory, a physician is
ultimately responsible for the care his patients receive and has a duty
40. Id. at § 2 comment b.
41. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 17-80-101 to 17-100-308 (1987 & Supp. 1989). These statutes
set forth Arkansas' general licensing requirements for various medical personnel. All other states
have similar requirements with the only real differences being the types of professions which re-
quire state licensing.
42. Id. See generally. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-114-201 to -209. (Supp. 1989). Obviously the
scope of the regulations varies from state to state.
43. For example, doctors must typically have a four-year undergraduate degree and a three-
year medical school degree before being eligible for licensing. Specialty certification requires two
to six more years of education in the specialty field. Nurses are typically required to complete two
to four years in a nursing education program before they are eligible for licensing and further
education if they are to specialize. See generally THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON VOCA-
TIONAL EDUCATION, The Education of Nurses: A Rising National Concern-Position Paper,
NURSING ISSUES AND NURSING STRATEGIES FOR THE EIGHTIES (1983).
44. The broader the range of discretion available to persons in performing assigned tasks,
the more likely they are to be independent contractors. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §
2 comment b (1958). See generally D. JERNIGAN & A. YOUNG, STANDARDS, JOB DESCRIPTIONS,
AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS FOR NURSING PRACTICE (1983) (discussing and outlining the
different range of duties typically ascribed to nine different types of nurses).
45. This is basically just a restatement of a principal's non-liability for the acts of indepen-
dent contractors. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 comment b (1958).
46. This is exactly what occurred in Runyan v. Goodrum, 147 Ark. 481, 228 S.W. 397
(1921).
47. "Non-delegable duty" is a theory by which liability may be imposed on a principal for
the acts of an independent contractor or an agent operating outside the scope of his agency. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 214 and comments (1958). See generally R. MORRIS & A.
MORITZ, DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND THE LAW (5th ed. 1971) (discussing the obligations that
attach to a doctor upon entering into a physician-patient relationship).
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to assure that the care given is proper in all circumstances,48 regardless
of the training and education49 that most medical professions require.
This implies that a physician may not justifiably rely 0 on the training,
skill, and experience of another in carrying out the physician's plan for
treatment. For example, under the "professionals approach,"51 if a phy-
sician ordered a nurse/employee to give a patient an injection and the
nurse injured the patient in doing so, the physician would not be liable
to the patient unless it was shown he was actually directing and con-
trolling the nurse's actions as she gave the shot.52 In contrast, under the
"non-delegable duties" approach, if the nurse was acting on the physi-
cian's order, the physician is liable; whether or not he was exercising
control in fact is irrelevant." Under this theory, the physician has the
right and duty to exercise control over the nurse's performance of the
task. In truth, courts following this approach are finding that the physi-
cian was himself negligent in failing to exercise control when he had a
duty to do so,"' not that he is being held to account for the acts of
another. 55
Central to all the approaches is the issue of control.56 Many
courts, in deciding "borrowed servant ' 57 and "captain-of-the-ship" ' 8
cases, have held specifically that in certain circumstances the physician
48. "The law contemplates that the physician is solely responsible for the diagnosis and
treatment of his patients." Mesedahl v. St. Luke's Hosp. Ass'n of Duluth, 194 Minn. 198, 206,
259 N.W. 819, 822 (1935).
49. See supra notes 41-43.
50. If the physician is going to be ultimately responsible for the acts of others who assist in
his patient's care, then what is the use of the licensing requirements and the statutory regulations
of the other health care professions? The author is arguing that a reason for the these require-
ments is to allow a physician to reasonably rely on the skills of others in caring for his patients.
See Swigerd v. City of Ortonville, 246 Minn. 339, 75 N.W.2d 217 (1956); Hallinan v. Prindle,
220 Cal. 46, 11 P.2d 426 (1936) (both discussing a physician's right to rely on the skill of others).
51. By "professionals approach" the author means the general idea of treating medical pro-
fessionals in the manner of independent contractors due to their skill, training, and knowledge.
52. This is because nurses are trained in how to give an injection and without the doctor's
actual control it must be presumed the nurse was exercising her professional discretion in the
manner in which she proceeded. Also, if the doctor is exercising actual control over her acts,
unless it is coerced, it can safely be assumed there is a true principal-agent relationship in effect.
53. It is worthy of note here that even if the nurse was not ordered to give the injection and
hence acted outside the scope of her agency, the doctor could still be liable under the non-delega-
ble duties approach. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 214 comment a (1958).
54. The author argues that this is what the court is in fact doing. But see id., stating that a
principal is liable under this theory without reference to his own negligence.
55. But see id.
56. See Morris, supra note 8, at 124.
57. See infra notes 65-116 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 117-36 and accompanying text.
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is presumed to be in, or have a right of, control over the other profes-
sional's actions."9 Proof of this presumption's preliminary fact, the right
of control, is relatively easy when the physician is the professional's
employer."0 However, when the physician is not the other's employer,
the preliminary fact is not so easily proved.6' It is in this last situation
that the issue of control becomes most important. In deciding this issue,
the courts resort heavily to the "borrowed servant" rule.62 The courts
use this doctrine in cases where a presumption of control does not ap-
ply, or as a means to justify the presumption. 3 This doctrine is used to
determine whether a master-servant relationship exists between the
physician and the non-employee professional with the physician playing
the role of the master.64
III. THE "BORROWED SERVANT" RULE
The "borrowed servant" rule holds that a "servant directed or per-
mitted by his master to perform services for another may become the
servant of such other in performing the services. He may become the
other's servant as to some acts and not as to others."6 5 Whether the
servant of the "general employer"66 has become the servant of the
"special employer"67 is an issue that is decided by looking to the degree
of control exercised over the employee by each employer.6"
59. In fact the "captain-of-the-ship" doctrine is a presumption that the surgeon has a right
to control all surgical personnel assisting in an operation. See McConnell v. Williams, 361 Pa.
355, 65 A.2d 243 (1949). "[l~t can readily be understood ... until the surgeon leaves .. .at the
conclusion of the operation ... he is in the same complete charge of those who are present ... as
is the captain of a ship over all on board .... Id. at 362, 65 A.2d at 246. See also Reuter, supra
note 6, at 643-46. See generally M. MCCAFFERTY & S. MEYER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE BASES
OF LIABILITY 122-25 (1985).
60. Obviously, unless the employee fits the definition of an independent contractor, the em-
ployer will have a right of control. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ I & 2 (1958).
61. When there is no employer-employee relationship, the courts must rely on circumstances
to determine whether the right of control exists. See generally Reuter, supra note 6.
62. See infra notes 65-116 and accompanying text.
63. For example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court discussed the rule extensively in fashion-
ing the "captain-of-the-ship" doctrine. See McConnell v. Williams, 361 Pa. 355, 65 A.2d 243
(1949).
64. The doctor is then, obviously, receptive to respondeat superior liability for the other
professional's negligence.
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 227 (1958).
66. The "general employer" is the "lending" master.
67. The "special employer" is the "borrowing" master.
68. There is a presumption that the general employer retains control, and the burden of
proof is on the party seeking to impose liability on the special employer to show that control
"shifted." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 227 comment b (1958). See also Reuter, supra
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Obviously, if too much control is shifted to the "special employer,"
the courts will find that a new contract of employment exists with the
"special employer." 9 On the other hand, if the special employer's de-
gree of control is small, the general employer, but not the special em-
ployer, will be vicariously liable.7 0 The question then, in medical situa-
tions, is: When does a physician have enough control over another
person to result in the physician being considered the "master" of the
other person who is rendering care? 71 The classic situation in which
this issue is raised occurs when a physician admits a patient to a hospi-
tal in which the physician is not a staff member, but merely has staff
privileges, and the patient is injured due to the negligence of a hospital
employee.72 For this and similar situations the courts have used various
tests to decide when the degree of control is enough.
These tests include the "administrative" versus "professional" acts
test,73 which holds a non-employer physician liable only for the "profes-
sional" acts of other health care professionals, and holds the hospital,
or general employer, liable for their "administrative" acts.7" The prob-
lem with this test is determining which acts are "administrative ' 75 and
which are "professional." 7 The courts have failed to create clear
guidelines to be used in this determination. 77 Also, many of the acts
note 6, at 614-24.
69. For example, if the right to discharge the employee, set his rate of pay, or change his
hours of work is given to the special employer, it is easy to see that the employee is no longer
actually employed by the general employer.
70. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
71. The author feels that when the other is a medical professional in his own right, it is only
when "actual control" is shown.
72. See generally Reuter, supra note 6.
73. The test originated in Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E.
92 (1914). See also Beaches Hosp. v. Lee, 384 So.2d 234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Swigerd v.
City of Ortonville, 246 Minn. 339, 75 N.W.2d 217 (1956). See generally Reuter, supra note 6, at
639-42; 41 C.J.S. Hospitals § 8 (1987).
74. Reuter, supra note 6, at 640.
75. These have been characterized as acts which do not require the application of the spe-
cialized technique or the understanding of a skilled physician or surgeon. Swigerd v. City of
Ortonville, 246 Minn. 339, 343, 75 N.W.2d 217, 222 (1956).
76. "Professional acts" are characterized as "those which require an exercise of medical
skill or judgment." Id. at 344, 75 N.W.2d at 221.
77. Placing an improperly capped hot water bottle on a patient's body is administrative
(lacono v. New York Polyclinic Med. School & Hosp., 296 N.Y. 502, 68 N.E.2d 450),
while keeping a hot water bottle too long on a patient's body is medical (Sutherland v.
New York Polyclinic Med. School & Hosp., 298 N.Y. 682, 82 N.E.2d 583). Adminis-
tering blood, by means of a transfusion, to the wrong patient is administrative (Neco-
layff v. Genesee Hosp., 296 N.Y. 936, 73 N.E.2d 117), while administering the wrong
blood to the right patient is medical (Berg. v. New York Soc. for Relief of Ruptured &
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regarded as "professional" by the courts are in reality such normal and
routine tasks of the tortfeasors 78 that it is difficult to justify character-
izing them as "professional" acts for which a physician is liable.79
Some courts recognizing this have rejected the "administrative" versus
"professional" distinction."0
Two tests of control used commonly in the industrial world, "scope
of employment" and "whose business," have been rejected in all juris-
dictions.81 The "scope of employment" test 2 finds the special employer
is in control of the tortfeasor when the task assigned falls outside the
scope of the tortfeasor's employment with the general employer.8 3 The
obvious problem with this is that the scope of most medical profession-
als' employment with their general employer encompasses their acts
when working at the direction of a special employer physician. 4 The
"whose business" test 5 holds the special employer liable for the acts of
the tortfeasor when such acts are primarily meant to advance the cause
of the special employer and not those of the general employer.8 6 The
obvious problem with this is that the "general cause" of the special
employer physician is rarely distinguishable from the general cause of
the professional's general employer. Both have the goal of providing
Crippled, 1 N.Y.2d 499, 154 N.Y.S.2d 455, 136 N.E.2d 523, reversing 286 App. Div.
783, 146 N.Y.S.2d 548). Employing an improperly sterilized needle for a hypodermic
injection is administrative (Peck v. Charles B. Towns Hosp., 275 App. Div. 302, 89
N.Y.S.2d 190), while improperly administering a hypodermic injection is medical (Bry-
ant v. Presbyterian Hosp. in City of N. Y., 304 N.Y. 538, 110 N.E.2d 391). Failing to
place sideboards on a bed after a nurse decided that they were necessary is administra-
tive (Ranelli v. Society of N. Y. Hosp., 295 N.Y. 850, 67 N.E.2d 257), while failing to
decide that sideboards should be used when the need does exist is medical (Grace v.
Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 301 N. Y. 660, 93 N.E.2d 926).
From distinctions such as these there is to be deduced neither guiding principle nor
clear delineation of policy ...
Bernardi v. Community Hosp. Ass'n, 166 Colo. 280, 289, 443 P.2d 708, 712 (1968).
78. See Reuter, supra note 6, at 641.
79. See Plunkett v. Hayes, 180 Ark. 505, 21 S.W.2d 851 (1929) (afrd on other grounds) in
which the physician argued, in effect, the nurse's acts were administrative and he therefore should
not have been held liable for them.
80. See Bernardi v. Community Hosp. Ass'n, 166 Colo. 280, 443 P.2d 708 (1968); Rice v.
California Lutheran Hosp., 27 Cal.2d 296, 163 P.2d 860 (1945). Cf. Dickerson v. American
Sugar Refining Co., 211 F.2d 200 (3rd Cir. 1954) (rejecting the test by implication).
81. See Reuter, supra note 6, at 637.
82. Id. at 616.
83. Id. See also Rogers v. Valley Outdoor Theater Co., 262 Wis. 658, 56 N.W.2d 503
(1953).
84. Reuter, supra note 6, at 616 n.82.
85. Id. at 637.
86. Id. at 614-16.
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adequate health care.87
The most commonly used test is the "right to control."88 Under
this approach, if the physician in question had a right to control the
actions of the other professional, he will be found liable on a respondeat
superior theory.89 The approach, while the most widely used, still has
many problems. There is rarely an express agreement as to who has a
"right of control" in what situations;90 hence the courts have to imply
the existence of the right based on circumstances. 91 Decisions on the
issue are far from consistent."2 Also, some consider the physician to
have a per se right of control over all who aid in caring for his patients.
This reasoning resembles the non-delegable duty approach.
Once a person is found to be a "servant" of the special employer,
the general employer is relieved of all liability by way of respondeat
superior.93 In the situation involving non-staff physicians and negligent
hospital employees, this rule determines whether the hospital or the
physician will be liable for the negligent acts of hospital employees. 94
87. Therefore, the main problem with the "whose business" and the "scope of the employ-
ment" tests is that in the health care field they fail to establish guidelines by which a court can
discriminate between a physician and another for the purposes of imposing respondeat superior
liability. Id. at 614-17, 637.
88. Id. at 617 n.86.
89. "The decisive test in determining whether the relation of master and servant exists is
whether the employer has the right to control and direct the servant .... " Keitz v. National
Paving & Contracting Co., 214 Md. 479, 491, 134 A.2d 296, 301 (1957) (emphasis in original).
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1) (1957); 57 C.J.S. Master and Servant § 2
(1948). See generally Dickerson v. American Sugar Refining Co., 211 F.2d 200 (3rd Cir. 1954).
"It is the power to control ... that answers the question." Id. at 204; Sparger v. Worley Hosp.,
Inc., 547 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. 1977). "[T]he essential inquiry would be whether or not the surgeon
had the right to control the assisting nurses .... Id. at 583 (emphasis in original).
90. Obviously if there is a specific agreement between the general and special employer as
to who has the right to control in what circumstances it will be easy to say who should be liable
under a respondeat superior theory for any set of given acts by the servant. See Reuter supra note
6, at 618-19, 638.
91. Id. at 619.
92. For example, in McDaniel v. Sage, 419 N.E.2d 1322 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) it was held
that a nurse in the company clinic was not the agent of the physician who ordered an injection
which was negligently given and caused the patient's injury. However, in Dickerson v. American
Sugar Refining Co., 211 F.2d 200 (3rd Cir. 1954), the court found on almost identical facts that
the nurse could have been subject to the physician's control and hence liability would not lie with
the company.
93. See 57 C.J.S. Master and Servant § 566 (1948).
94. "A hospital's best chance [to avoid liability] is to allege that, at the time of the negli-
gent act, the employee had been borrowed by ... the attending physician." Reuter, supra note 6,
at 608.
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Since the hospital is the general employer," it will be liable in the ab-
sence of proof that the physician "borrowed" its employees. 96 The
weight accorded the evidence and the tests used vary from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction on this issue. 97 A professional found to be the "borrowed
servant" of a physician in one jurisdiction may not be considered a
"borrowed servant" in another jurisdiction.98
It is also important to note how the involved professionals view the
issue of control.99 Typically, a non-employer physician has a right of
control over a nurse only in limited, narrow circumstances such as
when the physician orders the nurse to do something outside the nurse's
area of expertise. 100 It is the attitude that nurses and other medical
professionals are professionals in their own right"' that brings us to the
final test used by some courts to establish that a physician has "bor-
rowed" a "servant" - the "actual control" test.
The "actual control" test'012 is an offshoot of the "right to control"
test. 0 3 Under the "actual control" test, a showing that a physician ex-
ercised "actual control"'0 4 over the other professional's acts is either
evidence of a right of control or presumptive proof that a right of con-
trol exists.'0 5 However, it is the right of control that gives rise to the
liability.' 06 As viewed by this author, and advocated in this article, the
"actual control" test should stand alone as the test to be used10 7 for two
reasons. First, only when a physician exercises "actual control" does
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See generally Reuter, supra note 6; Morris, supra note 8.
98. For example, see supra note 92.
99. It is important to consider their views as they will be the ones testifying in a trial, and
their opinions as to who had control, or a right of control, will usually be the bulk of the evidence
the issue is decided on.
100. Interview with Joanne Lisk, R.N., M.S.N., C.N.S., Assistant Professor of Nursing,
Alcorn State University, Natchez, Mississippi.
101. See ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 22, at 1. "[N]urses are prepared to function at a
level commensurate with other health professionals." Id. See generally EVERY NURSE, supra note
22.
102. See Reuter, supra note 6, at 642-47.
103. Id. at 619.
104. The problem here is in determining what facts give rise to an inference of "actual
control" by a physician. Some courts have said the mere presence of a physician gives rise to a
presumption that the physician is in "actual control." Id. at 643.
105. Id. at 619.
106. Id.
107. The Oklahoma courts seem to have taken this position. See Aderhold v. Bishop, 94
Okla. 203, 221 P. 752 (1923) ("[T]he true test of the existence of the relation of master and
servant .. .depend[s] ...upon whether the master actually exercises supervision and control
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the other professional lose his discretion in carrying out the task. 108
Second, when a physician exercises actual control over another's acts,
unless submission to the control is coerced, it must be presumed that
the other has voluntarily submitted to the control of the physician, and
hence, a true "master-servant" relationship is in effect.10 Since the de-
cisions on the issue of control vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction 10
and hinge on no one particular fact,1 ' an attorney faced with this issue
must examine previous cases in his jurisdiction to determine which fac-
tors and tests have been stressed as most important.
The importance of the "borrowed servant" rule has diminished
somewhat in recent times with the abolishment of the doctrine of
"charitable immunity" for hospitals.1 2 This doctrine held that hospi-
tals and other health care institutions were a public service; public pol-
icy required their immunity from suit." 3 When this doctrine applies, a
plaintiff will not recover from a hospital because of an injury occa-
sioned by the acts of negligent employees." 4 It therefore becomes more
over the servant during the time he uses such servant." Id. at 206, 221 P. at 755 (emphasis
added)); Randolph v. Oklahoma City General Hosp., 180 Okla. 513, 71 P.2d 607 (1937) ("[S]o
long as [the nurse] was under the doctor's immediate supervision the hospital was not responsible
for her actions." Id. at 514, 71 P.2d at 608 (emphasis added)).
Oregon seems to lean in this direction as well. See May v. Broun, 261 Or. 28, 492 P.2d 776
(1972) (When a surgeon does not "exercise direct supervision or control over [a] machine or its
operation, respondeat superior liability does not attach to the surgeon." Id. at 40, 492 P.2d at 782
(emphasis in original)).
Colorado also seems to be taking this approach. See Bernardi v. Community Hosp. Ass'n, 166
Colo. 280, 443 P.2d 708 (1968). Both the hospital and the plaintiff argued the right to control was
the test to be used. The court seems to disagree in its statement that the doctor "not being present
when the injection was given, had no opportunity to control its administration. His instructions
that injections were to be given did not give rise to a master-servant relationship." Id. at 294, 443
P.2d at 715. See generally Miller v. Hood, 536 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976, writ refd
n.r.e.) (physician not liable unless hospital nurse gave medication under his supervision or con-
trol); Hallinan v. Prindle, 17 Cal. App. 2d 656 62 P.2d 1075 (1937) (physician not liable when
nurse substituted formalin for novacaine on surgical tray); Annotation, Liability of Operating
Surgeon for Negligence of Nurse Assisting Him, 12 A.L.R.3d 1017 (1967); Reuter, supra note 6,
at 642-47; M. MCCAFFERTY & S. MEYER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE BASES OF LIABILITY 118-19
(1985).
108. See EVERY NURSE, supra note 22. "Each registered nurse is directly accountable and
responsible to the consumer for the quality of nursing care rendered." Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
109. The right to control and submission to control must be voluntarily given and assumed
to give rise to a master-servant relationship. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958).
110. See Reuter, supra note 6, at 642-43.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 634.
113. Id. at 606.
114. A plaintiff should not recover even if the hospital itself was negligent, as in, for exam-
ple, hiring an incompetent nurse. Another theory is that the hospital itself did not undertake to
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important to show that the physician was the "special employer" of the
hospital employee who caused the injury. 115 Today, hospitals can gener-
ally be sued for their vicarious liability, and it is not necessary to sue
the physician just to insure that the plaintiff has sued a non-immune
defendant."'
IV. THE "CAPTAIN-OF-THE-SHIP" DOCTRINE
Surgery presents special problems in the use of the "borrowed ser-
vant" rule."' A surgical nurse is working both for the hospital and the
surgeon during a surgical proceeding." 8 The problem involves deter-
mining which acts the surgeon has "borrowed" the nurse for" 9 and
which acts the nurse is performing for the hospital. 2 To handle this
problem, the courts have fashioned the "captain-of-the-ship" doctrine.
First announced in McConnell v. Williams,'2' this doctrine holds an
operating surgeon liable per se for the negligent acts of all surgical
personnel that occur in surgery.'22
In "captain-of-the-ship" cases the crucial question is often at what
provide medical treatment, but rather was merely a place where medical professionals came to
render treatment. See Moon v. Mercy Hosp., 150 Colo. 430, 373 P.2d 944 (1962). This argument
against a hospital's liability has similarly been rejected. See Darling v. Charleston Community
Memorial Hosp., 33 11. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied 383 U.S. 946 (1966). See
generally W. CURRAN & E. SHAPIRO, LAW. MEDICINE AND FORENSIC SCIENCE 364-90 (3rd ed.
1982).
115. Otherwise, the plaintiff was without recourse for his injury. Reuter, supra note 6, at
603.
116. Id.
117. This is because "[t]here is no doubt that a surgeon has the right to control the employ-
ees of the hospital ... in the carrying out of their functions during surgery." May v. Broun, 261
Or. 28, 36, 492 P.2d 776, 780 (1972) (emphasis added). In other words, the mere fact the injury
occurred in surgery gives grounds for imposing liability on the surgeon for the negligence of other
surgical personnel under a pure borrowed servant "right to control" test. As would be expected,
many courts are reluctant to automatically assess liability against a surgeon on this basis alone.
118. Therefore, the "whose business" test and the "scope of the employment" test are of no
use in determining who should bear the brunt of liability under respondeat superior for an injury
occurring in surgery.
119. A common situation involves the counting of sponges and what happens when one is
left in a patient after surgery. See Guilbeau v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 325 So.2d 395
(La. App. 1975) (holding that leaving a sponge in a patient was negligence per se on the part of
the surgeon, and he could not escape liability by reliance on the nurse's duty to count the
sponges).
120. See Sparger v. Worley Hosp., Inc., 547 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. 1977) (holding that the
counting of sponges was a duty the nurse performed for the hospital and not the surgeon).
121. 361 Pa. 355, 65 A.2d 243 (1949).
122. Reuter, supra note 6, at 644; Morris, supra note 8, at 125-26. See also M. MCCAF-
FERTY & S. MEYER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE BASES OF LIABILITY 122 (1985).
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point did the surgeon enter the operating room."2 3 Actually, the "cap-
tain-of-the-ship" doctrine is an extension of the "borrowed servant"
rule 24 which states that surgery is such a specialized procedure that all
involved are necessarily the "servants" of the "master" surgeon. 25 The
importance of this doctrine lies in the fact that the burden of proof for
a plaintiff is reduced. Once the plaintiff shows he was negligently in-
jured in surgery, 2 " the principal-agent relationship between the physi-
cian and other surgical personnel is presumed; there is no need to re-
solve a "right to control" issue.
Because most jurisdictions recognize to some extent the idea that
surgical personnel are experts in their own right, 27 or because they feel
the plaintiff should not have the benefit of the principal-agent presump-
tion raised by the doctrine, 28 some courts have rejected the "captain-
of-the-ship" doctrine outright. 9 Others have said it does not apply
across the board to all personnel in a surgical setting.3 0 The courts
that use the rule justify its use by reference to proof problems faced by
a plaintiff suing for an injury that occurred in surgery.1a
123. Reuter, supra note 6, at 644. See also Hallinan v. Prindle, 17 Cal. App. 2d 656, 62
P.2d 1075 (1936) (surgeon not liable for negligence in preparing a patient for surgery); Nichter v.
Edmiston, 81 Nev. 606, 407 P.2d 721 (1965) (surgeon not liable under respondeat superior until
surgery actually begins); May v. Broun, 261 Or. 28, 492 P.2d 776 (1972) (surgeon has control
only during surgery); Hohenthal v. Smith, 114 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (surgeon's control ends
when he leaves after surgery is completed).
124. See generally M. MCCAFFERTY & S. MEYER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE BASES OF LIA-
BILITY 122-24 (1985); Reuter, supra note 6, at 643-45.
125. Therefore the surgeon is liable per se under respondeat superior for the negligent acts
of others that occur in surgery.
126. Res ipsa loquitur and negligence per se are the main theories used by plaintiffs injured
during surgery. See generally M. MCCAFFERTY & S. MEYER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE BASES OF
LIABILITY 122; Reuter, supra note 6, at 644.
127. See Sherman v. Hartman, 137 Cal. App. 2d 589, 290 P.2d 894 (1955) (holding a
physician is entitled to rely on the skill and expertise of a nurse in giving a transfusion). See also
cases cited in supra note 123. See generally, EVERY NURSE, supra note 22, at 109-25.
128. They generally feel it is unfair to the surgeon to give the presumption to the plaintiff.
Cf. Sparger v. Worley Hosp., Inc., 547 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. 1977); Parker v. St. Paul Fire and
Marine Ins. Co., 335 So.2d 725 (La. Ct. App. 1976).
129. See supra note 128. It should be noted here that the jurisdiction given credit for
originating the "captain-of-the-ship" doctrine has retreated from a strict application of it, saying
its discussion of it was merely an example of borrowed servant rules. See Thomas v. Hutchinson,
442 Pa. 118, 275 A.2d 23 (1971); Tonsic v. Wagner, 458 Pa. 246, 329 A.2d 497 (1974).
130. Reuter, supra note 6, at 644 n.228 and accompanying text.
131. Cf. Mazer v. Lipschutz, 327 F.2d 42 (3rd Cir. 1964). "If operating surgeons were not
to be held liable for the negligent performance of the duties of those then working under them, the
law would fail in large measure to afford a means of redress for preventable injuries sustained
during the course of such operations." Id. at 49 (quoting McConnell at 364, 65 A.2d at 247, and
UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:183
A major criticism of the rule is that the surgeon has no opportu-
nity to absolve himself of liability with proof that the tortfeasor was not
subject to or did not operate under his control.' 32 Another criticism of
the rule can be found in the fact that this doctrine, like the pure "bor-
rowed servant" rule, will relieve a hospital of liability when an injury
occurs. 133 It seems unfair to allow the burden of liability to fall on an
"outside physician"'1 4 when the injury resulted from the acts of surgi-
cal assistants or technicians employed by the hospital. 35 Also, under
the enterprise liability rule131 it would seem that the hospital is in a
better position to absorb the cost and pass it along to its customers than
is the "outside physician."
V. THE ARKANSAS APPROACH
In Arkansas, respondeat superior and the "borrowed servant" rule
are alive and well. 137 However, the Arkansas appellate courts have
never addressed the "captain-of-the-ship" doctrine. Likewise, the
courts have never applied the "borrowed servant" rule in a medical set-
ting in Arkansas.3 " Most Arkansas cases proceed on the theory that
the physician was negligent in some way.' 3 9 There are, however, a few
Rockwell v. Kaplan, 404 Pa. 574, 579, 173 A.2d 54, 56 (1961)). While use of res ipsa loquitur
allows a plaintiff to prove a compensable injury, it does not reveal who should do the
compensating.
132. The defendant in Mazer did argue this, but his arguments were to no avail due to the
application of the doctrine.
133. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
134. By "outside physician" the author means a surgeon who is not a hospital employee.
135. Most operations require, in addition to the actual surgeon, an anesthesiologist, a surgi-
cal assistant (who may or may not be another doctor), a scrub nurse and a surgical or "floating"
nurse.
136. See Reuter, supra note 6, at 656-58.
137. See Billings v. Gipson, 297 Ark. 510, 763 S.W.2d 85 (1989) (finding objection to jury
instruction on borrowed servant rule meritless when servant was not negligent to begin with);
George's, Inc. v. Otwell, 282 Ark. 152, 666 S.W.2d 406 (1984). "[T]he most significant question
regarding a loaned employee is [who] has direction and control of the employee." Id. at 154, 666
S.W.2d at 407.
138. The issues of control inherent in a borrowed servant analysis have, however, been dis-
cussed. The court has not expressly based a ruling on this doctrine in a medical situation though.
See infra notes 140-72 and accompanying text.
139. See Garst v. Cullum, 291 Ark. 512, 726 S.W.2d 271 (1987) (The court held that both
physicians involved in the treatment were negligent in their own right.); Kelley v. Wiggins, 291
Ark. 280, 724 S.W.2d 443 (1987) (The court found both the clinic and the physician liable for
negligent treatment of a patient who died. The court expressly found the physician's negligence
was not an "intervening cause" so as to relieve the clinic of liability. There was also evidence a
nurse failed to inform the doctor that the patient was having seizures. But, no holding was based
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interesting cases-the two most noteworthy of which are Runyan v.
Goodrum 4 ' and Gray v. McLaughlin.""
In Runyan the Arkansas Supreme Court held that a general prac-
titioner was not liable for the acts of the x-ray technician he em-
ployed. 4" The court based its ruling on the fact that the x-ray techni-
cian had specialized training in the use of the x-ray equipment,
whereas his employer, the physician who told him to use it, had
none.' 3 The court took a step toward the "professionals approach" '144
with this case. It expressly found an x-ray technician could not be an
agent of his employer when the employer did not have the same special
training and skills as the alleged agent.
1 45
A few years later in Gray, the court retreated from its earlier rul-
ing and held on virtually identical facts that the employer was liable.
146
What makes the ruling most noteworthy is the fact that the court dis-
tinguished Runyan because the physician/employer was a general prac-
titioner, 47 and in Gray he was a radiologist. 48 The rules are fairly
clear as to radiologists as a result of Gray. If the radiologist employs an
x-ray technician, he will be liable for the x-ray technician's acts.149 If,
on the other hand, an "ignorant"' 150 physician hires an x-ray technician,
the physician will not be liable.15' However, as to nurses and other
medical professionals, the Arkansas courts have not been so clear.
In Plunkett v. Hays1 2 the court was faced with the issue of a
physician's respondeat superior liability for the acts of a nurse.'53 The
on this evidence.); White v. Mitchell, 263 Ark. 787, 568 S.W.2d 216 (1978) (The court found the
treating physician negligent, but dismissed the claim against the attending physician who, it seems
from the facts, could have prevented the plaintiff's injury.)
140. 147 Ark. 481, 228 S.W. 397 (1921).
141. 207 Ark. 191, 179 S.W.2d 686 (1944).
142. Runyan, 147 Ark. at 499, 228 S.W. at 404.
143. Id. at 489-90, 228 S.W. at 400.
144. See supra note 51 (defining "professionals approach").
145. 147 Ark. at 490, 228 S.W. at 400.
146. 207 Ark. at 196, 179 S.W.2d at 688.
147. 147 Ark. at 483, 228 S.W. at 397.
148. 207 Ark. at 193, 179 S.W.2d at 687.
149. Id. at 196, 179 S.W.2d at 688. This is the holding in Gray. See also Door v. Fike, 177
Ark. 907, 9 S.W.2d 318 (1928); Dorr, Gray & Johnson v. Headstream, 173 Ark. 1104, 295 S.W.
16 (1927). Both of these cases involved a partnership of which Dr. Gray was a member. The issue
of agency was not discussed in these cases as the negligent party was an actual partner, not just
an employee, and hence all partners were liable.
150. By "ignorant" the author means a physician without expertise in the field.
•151. This is the holding in Runyan.
152. 180 Ark. 505, 21 S.W. 2d 851 (1929).
153. Id. at 506, 21 S.W.2d at 852. It should be noted here that both the physician and the
1991]
UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:183
nurse, acting on the physician's orders, gave an injection to a five year
old girl who later died. 1 " Evidence at trial indicated that the nurse had
injected a toxic substance into the victim. 55 The defendant argued that
he should not be liable because he was not present at the time the shot
was given,1 56 nor did he designate which of the available nurses was to
give the shot.157 He also, and most notably, argued: "[T]he act [can]
be performed by the nurse as well as by a physician .. ". .",5' The
physician cited Runyan in support of his position.159 The court, how-
ever, did not decide the case on the issues raised by his arguments. 6 It
instead based its ruling' on the facts that the defendant physician
would not reveal the identity of the nurse who gave the shot and that
he expressly avowed his responsibility for her acts.
16 2
Also worthy of note at this point are the Arkansas Code Anno-
tated sections that lay out the licensing requirements for nurse and lay
midwives.163 Most interesting is the section stating, "A nurse midwife
. ..shall not be deemed an agent or employee of the consulting physi-
cian16 solely on the basis of a consulting physician agreement .. .
No similar provision exists in the statutes dealing with lay midwives. 66
Obviously, the Arkansas General Assembly feels that a physician's ex-
posure to respondeat superior liability for the acts of registered nurses
nurse were apparently employed by the clinic with the doctor playing the role of clinic supervisor.
Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 508-09, 21 S.W.2d at 853.
156. Id. at 510, 21 S.W.2d at 853.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 509, 21 S.W.2d at 853. This could possibly be viewed as an argument that the
act was "administrative" as opposed to "professional." See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying
text.
159. Plunkett, 180 Ark. at 509, 21 S.W.2d at 853.
160. Id. at 510, 21 S.W.2d at 853. Besides the possible "administrative" vs. "professional"
acts issue, the author here argues the physician raised the issue of "actual control" and the "pro-
fessionals approach" by his testimony that he was not present, that he did not select the nurse,
and that a nurse is as qualified to give an injection as a physician. See supra note 158.
161. Their actual ruling reversed a directed verdict in the doctor's favor. 180 Ark. at 510,
21 S.W.2d at 853.
162. Id. at 507, 510, 21 S.W.2d at 852, 853.
163. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 17-86-501 to -507 (1987) (nurse midwives) and §§ 17-85-101 to
-107 (Supp. 1989) (lay midwives).
164. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-86-506 (1987) (requiring a nurse midwife to have a con-
sulting physician agreement with a doctor who has obstetrical privileges in a hospital as a prereq-
uisite to practicing midwifery).
165. ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-86-507 (1987) (emphasis added).
166. However, lay midwives must practice under a physician's supervision. ARK. CODE
ANN. § 17-85-107(b) (Supp. 1989).
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acting as midwives should be limited.
The court has addressed the liability of a doctor for the negligent
acts of another doctor. In Norton v. Hefner'67 a physician from Lake
Village, Arkansas, left his patient in the care of another physician'" in
Little Rock after surgery. Allegedly, this other physician's negligence
caused the plaintiff's injury." 9 The court held that absent proof that
the defendant-physician was negligent in his selection of the other phy-
sician, he could not be held liable. 70
The Norton case is cited for support by the dissent in Chicago R.I.
& P.R.R. v. Britt.17 ' Here a nurse assisting in surgery was injured due
to the surgeon's negligence."' 2 What makes the case interesting for our
purposes is the fact the railroad company that had a contract for the
surgeon's and nurse's services along with the use of the hospital's facili-
ties was held liable to the nurse on a respondeat superior theory. 73 In
his dissent, 174 Justice McHaney, quoting an earlier case which held a
railroad not liable to a patient for the malpractice of a company physi-
cian, 75 stated:
A physician cannot be regarded as an agent or servant in the usual
sense of the term, since he is not and necessarily cannot be directed in
the diagnosing of diseases and injuries and prescribing treatment
therefor, his office being to exercise his best skill and judgment in




Another interesting case along these lines is Black v. Bearden.177
In this case the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, a dentist, had
overcharged him and was guilty of malpractice. 178 The court remanded
the case for a new trial because it could not tell which of the claims the
167. 132 Ark. 18, 198 S.W. 97 (1917).
168. The other doctor was an intern at the hospital. Id. at 21, 198 S.W. at 98.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 22, 198 S.W. at 99. "ITihe doctrine of respondeat superior... does not apply to
a physician . . . who, when employed, acts upon his own initiative and without direction from
others." Id. at 23, 198 S.W. at 98 (emphasis in original). The doctrine applies to a "servant who
acts under the direction and control of the master." Id.
171. 189 Ark. 571, 74 S.W.2d 398 (1934).
172. Id. at 576-77, 74 S.W.2d at 398.
173. Id. at 584, 74 S.W.2d at 403-04.
174. Id. at 584-92, 75 S.W.2d at 404-07.
175. See Arkansas Midland R.R. Co. v. Pearson, 98 Ark. 399, 135 S.W. 917 (1911).
176. Britn, 189 Ark. at 586, 74 S.W.2d at 405 (McHaney, J., dissenting).
177. 167 Ark. 455, 268 S.W. 27 (1925).
178. Id. at 456, 268 S.W. at 27.
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jury based its verdict on, and the claim for overcharging could not be
sustained on the evidence.179 What is important to our discussion is
that the defendant's assistant, himself a dentist, was apparently the ac-
tual tortfeasor. °80 Unfortunately, the court never reached any of the
agency issues.' 81
The issue of respondeat superior was also apparent, but not dis-
cussed, in the cases of Napier v. Northrum
s2 and Dunman v. Raney. l8 3
In Napier the issue was avoided by a ruling that the acts of an anesthe-
siologist were not negligent.' 4 In Dunman the defendant physician
was, in effect, an assistant to the actual treating physician. 185 He as-
sumed care of the patient when the physician who set the patient's bro-
ken leg left.' The defendant later returned the patient to the original
treating physician's care. 187 The evidence was conflicting, but the origi-
nal physician who set the leg testified the leg was dislocated when he
saw the plaintiff twelve days after setting it.8 8 He also stated it was
not setting right when he took complete control of the case some two
months later.'8 9 However, the defendant-physician was found liable
with no real discussion of the other physician's responsibility or any
respondeat superior theory for shifting liability from one physician to
another.' 90
VI. CONCLUSION
While the Arkansas courts have rarely faced the issue of a physi-
cian's respondeat superior liability for the acts of other professionals,' 91
179. Id. at 459-60, 268 S.W. at 28-29.
180. Id. at 456-57, 268 S.W. at 27.
181. The court had no need to discuss the issue of agency in light of the actual holding.
Under a Gray-type analysis liability would be imposed anyway. See supra note 141. See infra
notes 220 to 233 and accompanying text.
182. 264 Ark. 406, 572 S.W.2d 153 (1978).
183. 118 Ark. 337, 176 S.W. 339 (1915).
184. 264 Ark. 406, 409-10, 572 S.W.2d 153, 155.
185. 118 Ark. 337, 341-42, 176 S.W. 339, 340-41.
186. Id. at 339, 176 S.W. at 341. It is not absolutely clear from the opinion, but it appears
that the plaintiff initially sought treatment from the defendant who in turn called in the physician
who actually set the leg.
187. Id. at 342, 176 S.W. at 341. It is not clear why the defendant left or turned the patient
over to the other doctor.
188. Id. at 341-42, 176 S.W. at 341.
189. Id. at 342, 176 S.W. at 341. He further testified the defendant had rendered proper
care in the case.
190. Id.
191. See supra note 7 (defining "medical professionals").
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it is obvious they will eventually face the issue again. It is hoped that at
that time they will continue the commendable approach begun in Run-
yan and Norton.'92
The holdings in these cases recognize that doctors give orders but
rely on other professionals to carry them out.19 Further, it is hoped
that Arkansas will reject the "captain-of-the-ship"' 9' doctrine and treat
surgery as any other medical setting.'95 Finally, the author hopes the
Arkansas courts will apply the "actual control" test 96 to situations in-
volving both employees of the physician and his "borrowed ser-
vants."' 97 A requirement that "actual control" be shown before respon-
deat superior will attach liability to the physician recognizes the
discretion various medical professionals have in the manner of perform-
ing their tasks.' Only when a physician is actually directing the other
professional's acts has he gained sufficient control over that profes-
sional's discretion to qualify himself as a "principal" and the profes-
sional as his "agent.'
99
To fully implement the "actual control" test. consistently for all
medical professionals, without overruling Runyan or Gray, the Arkan-
sas courts must distinguish Gray. The distinction should be based on
the physician/employer's expertise in the field.2"' In other words, Ar-
kansas should recognize a "Gray" exception to the "actual control" test
for physicians acting as employers. 20 1 This exception would find respon-
deat superior liability when a physician is the employer of the actual
192. See supra notes 142-45 and 167-70 and accompanying text. See also notes 171-76 and
accompanying text.
193. Supra note 33 and accompanying text.
194. Supra notes 117-36 and accompanying text.
195. That is, by use of regular agency rules without the "captain-of-the-ship" doctrine or
similar presumptions.
196. Supra notes 102-09 and accompanying text.
197. While the test is discussed generally in situations involving borrowed servants, the rul-
ing in Runyan makes it possible to logically apply it to employment situations.
198. See D. JERNIGAN & A. YOUNG, STANDARDS, JOB DESCRIPTIONS, AND PERFORMANCE
EVALUATIONS FOR NURSING PRACTICE (1983) (outlining typical duties and discretions of different
types of nurses). See generally EVERY NURSE, supra note 22.
199. This is the author's position. Obviously, some take the position that a mere right of
control gives rise to a master-servant relationship between professionals. See supra notes 88-92
and accompanying text. The problem with this view is that a physician always has a right of
control over others who render treatment to the physician's patients. See supra note 117.
200. This is the basis on which the Arkansas Supreme Court distinguished Gray from Run-
yan. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.




tortfeasor and both the tortfeasor and the physician have an expertise
in the same specialty. 02 For example, a surgeon would be liable for the
acts of a surgical nurse in his employ, but not liable, absent a showing
of "actual control," for the acts of an emergency room nurse in his
employ.20 3 Or, as in Gray, a radiologist would be liable for the negli-
gence of an x-ray technician in his employ, but not for the negligence
of a general practitioner he employed.20
It seems more appropriate to find a specialist in a field liable for
the acts of his professional staff who have a similar expertise. 0 5 As a
specialist, the physician should be more aware of the other profes-
sional's range of function within the field.20 ' As an employer, he is
more likely to exercise "actual control" over the acts of professional
employees working in the same specialty as himself than he is over
other professional employees. 0 7
The above approach will leave the court's decision in Gray intact
while at the same time recognizing the "professionals approach.
°2 08
Under this modified "actual control" procedure, a general practitioner
would not be liable for the acts of an employee-professional with exper-
tise in a specialty whose characteristic manner of performance is some-
thing the physician is familiar with only generally20 9 unless it is shown
he was exercising "actual control. ' 210 This seems only fair and appears
to be the logic at work in Runyan.
By the same token, and in keeping with Gray, the general practi-
tioner would not be liable, without a showing of "actual control," for
202. Both of these factors were present in Gray and were cited as the reason for the deci-
sion. 207 Ark. 191, 196, 179 S.W.2d 686, 688 (1944).
203. This is because a surgeon is not an expert in emergency care. See generally D. JERNI-
GAN & A. YOUNG, STANDARDS, JOB DESCRIPTIONS, AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS FOR NURS-
ING PRACTICE (1983) (outlining the difference in duties of a surgical nurse and an emergency care
nurse).
204. Cf Norton v. Hefner, 132 Ark. 18, 198 S.W. 97 (1917).
205. Cf Gray, 207 Ark. 191, 179 S.W.2d 686 (1944).
206. The court pointed this out in Gray as a justification for their holding and seeming
departure from the Runyan ruling. Id. at 196, 179 S.W.2d at 688.
207. Obviously, as an employer a physician is likely to exercise "actual control" over all his
employees. However, he is more likely to exercise such control over professionals whose duties he
is familiar with due to his similar expertise than he is over other professional employees.
208. Supra note 51 and accompanying text.
209. E.g. Runyan-type situations.
210. Admittedly, it will be easier to show "'actual control" over an employee than a non-
employee. However, the author maintains such a showing should be required before respondeat




the acts of a general nurse in his employ as neither of them are "spe-
cialists" in any one field."' Also, a specialist, while vicariously liable
for the acts of his similarly specialized employees, would not be liable
for the acts of non-specialized professional employees or employees
with a specialty in another field. This final rule is necessary to keep
with the "professionals approach" '212 of insulating physicians from re-
spondeat superior liability for the discretionary acts of other profession-
als. It also will keep the "Gray" exception within the narrow confines
of cases involving specialists and their similarly specialized employ-
ees.213 The final result then, will be that a physician is not liable on a
respondeat superior theory for the acts of other professionals (in his
employ or not) without a showing of "actual control" unless the physi-
cian is a specialist in a field and the injury was caused by a professional
employee with a similar specialty." 4
In proving "actual control" the issue of the other professional's
training and general duties will become crucial.21a When it is shown
211. Some might argue they are both specialists in the practice of general medicine and
hence under Gray the physician should be liable for the nurse's acts as she is a similarly special-
ized employee. However, this view would seem to defeat the logic in the distinction made by the
court between general practioners in Runyan and specialists in Gray. 207 Ark. 191, 179 S.W.2d
686 (1944).
212. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
213. In other words, it is only when the tortfeasor is a specialized employee of a similarly
specialized physician that the presumption of "actual control" created by the "'Gray" exception
should apply. In all other instances the plaintiff should have to prove "actual control."
214. If the similarly specialized professional is not an employee of the physician then Gray
would not apply, and a finding of "actual control" would be required to show the physician in
question "borrowed" the other professional. Therefore, the author advocates that for a physician
to be liable on a respondeat superior basis for the acts of another medical professional the plaintiff
must show the physician was exercising "actual control" over the professional. The only exception
to the rule would be that "actual control" is presumed to exist when the physician and the other
professional are in an employer-employee relationship and they both have similar expertise in a
specialized field of practice such as in Gray, 207 Ark. 191, 179 S.W.2d 686 (1944) (radiologist
and x-ray technician).
215. Admittedly this may bear a resemblance to a "scope of the employment" test analysis.
However, instead of saying the professional was acting outside the scope of his duties with the
general employer, and hence the "special employer" is liable for the acts, the "actual control"
view of the issue is that any proof that the professional was working outside his usual scope of
duties with the "general employer" is not conclusive proof he has become the servant of the spe-
cial employer physician, it is merely evidence of such. If, for example, a physician requests a nurse
to do something she has been trained for, but has never actually been required to do for the
hospital, it is evidence she is subject to the doctor's "actual control." However, the fact she has
been trained in the performance of the requested task cuts against a finding of "actual control"
and is evidence to be weighed in determining the issue. On the other hand, a "scope of the em-
ployment" analysis will easily find the doctor liable for the acts due to the fact that the acts are
not within the nurse's regular duties for the hospital. See generally D. JERNIGAN & A. YOUNG,
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the other professional is operating outside the sphere of his training
and/or usual duties it is much more likely that the physician is exercis-
ing "actual control" over his performance.216 Also of importance in
proving "actual control" is the physical location of the physician at the
time the negligent act occurred.2 17 If he is present at the time of injury,
there is a much greater likelihood that he was in "actual control." '218
Care must be taken, however, not to let the mere presence of the physi-
cian be conclusive proof of "actual control."21 9
Finally, of importance in proving actual control is the specificity
with which the physician gives his instructions.2 0 If, for example, a
physician ordered a shot of ten milligrams of Valium in the right arm
of the patient and, in the physician's presence, the nurse negligently
injures the patient when she injects twenty milligrams in the left arm,
there is greater evidence of the physician's "actual control" over the
procedure than if he had merely ordered the nurse to give the patient a
tranquilizer and then left.22" ' Ultimately, whether the physician was ex-
ercising "actual control" is a matter of fact to be decided by the jury.
Some will criticize this approach by saying it will leave innocent
plaintiffs without redress for injuries suffered at the hands of negligent,
judgment-proof professionals.222 They will in particular object to this
approach when the negligent professional is the physician's em-
ployee.2 23 The claim will be that this approach is too strict a limitation
STANDARDS, JOB DESCRIPTIONS, AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS FOR NURSING PRACTICE
(1983) (outlining the different duties performed by different types of medical professionals).
216. It is important to note that a medical professional may be working outside his usual
scope of duties with one employer, but may still be acting within the range of his professional
discretion and training.
217. See Reuter, supra note 6, at 643-44. The "captain-of-the-ship" doctrine is premised on
the idea that a surgeon is in control by the mere fact of his presence.
218. Cf. Norton v. Hefner, 132 Ark. 18, 198 S.W. 97 (1917). Compare Plunkett v. Hays,
180 Ark. 505, 21 S.W.2d 851 (1929) (doctor liable for negligent injection given outside his pres-
ence) with Bernardi v. Community Hosp. Ass'n, 166 Colo. 280, 443 P.2d 708 (1968) (doctor not
liable for injection given outside his presence).
219. This is the flaw in the "captain-of-the ship" doctrine.
220. Of course, whether or not the physician is the other's employer is also an important
factor to look at in deciding the issue of "actual control."
221. Applying Gray we could easily find liability in either situation if the physician was a
psychiatrist and the nurse was a psychiatric nurse practitioner in his employ.
222. This was the original reason the "borrowed servant" rule and other methods of finding
vicarious liability on the part of a physician were so important in the past. See Reuter, supra note
6, at 603. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
223. But see Runyan v. Goodrum, 147 Ark. 481, 228 S.W. 397 (1921). The author was
unable to locate any critism by a court of the decision in Runyan.
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of the traditional respondeat superior theory of liability. 24 The answer
to this is that most employers of medical professionals have liability
insurance to cover claims against the professionals so employed. 225
Also, personal liability insurance is available to those professionals who
are not covered by their employers. 226 The plaintiffs will not be without
recourse. What is suggested is that the physician himself should not be
answerable in damages for the acts of other professionals unless he was
in "actual control."
Finally, in further support of the approach being advocated here,
is the argument that nurses, x-ray technicians, and others similarly sit-
uated are professionals in their own right. 22' They carry out their du-
ties, usually, with a broad range of discretion 22  and expertise.229 Their
relationship with a physician is more akin to that of an independent
contractor.230 Usually the physician assigns a task to be accomplished,
but does not direct the other professional in the manner of its perform-
ance. 21' The professional directs himself. It is only when the physician
is exercising "actual control" that it can be said a true principal-agent
relationship has come about whereby respondeat superior may be used
to hold the physician liable for the negligence of other medical
professionals.
224. The traditional approach focus is on the right to control. However, as pointed out in
this article, doctors always have a right to control the treatment of their patients.
225. For example, ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-210 (1987) authorizes action directly against a
liability insurance carrier.
226. See Reuter, supra note 6, at 605-06.
227. "[Nlurses are prepared to function at a level commensurate with other health profes-
sionals." ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 22, at 1.
228. See generally EVERY NURSE, supra note 22, at 11-18.
229. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
230. "Each registered nurse is directly accountable and responsible to the consumer for the
quality of nursing care rendered." EVERY NURSE, supra note 22, at 11. "Surgeons no longer
'borrow' hospital employees; instead, the hospital is supplying certain services directly to the pa-
tient .... Id. at 68. "[Wjhen nurses are carrying out their professional acts concerned with
patients' medical or nursing needs, i.e., following physicians' orders, they may be independent
contractors." Id. at 110. See generally ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 22.
231. He may have a right to control the performance, but he should not he held liable
unless he actually does so.
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